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Conclusion
The 1998 elections in Naga City took place in an atmosphere mixed with
expectation and speculation, since Jesse Robredo was barred from running for
mayor because of constitutional prohibition against locally elected officials
having four consecutive terms. With Robredo not in the running, opposition
candidates tried to take advantage of the situation. However, Robredo contin-
ued to stay in the center of Naga politics through the election period, and his
candidates captured all the elective offices in Naga City, from the congres-
sional seat to City Council. This was repeated in the 2001 elections, which
means that Robredo’s party has swept all the elective seats in the city for four
consecutive elections, namely, the 1992, 1995, 1998, and now the 2001 elec-
tions. This proves that Robredo’s way of holding power has been tremen-
dously effective.
What does this case study of Naga City tell us? For one thing, it reveals the
limitations of the conventional sociocultural approach. Sociocultural factors
like the cultural values of patron-client relationships or private wealth are less
decisive for the holding of power in Naga City politics. Grassroots leaders
under both Luis Villafuerte and Raul Roco easily shifted their support to a
newcomer, Robredo. The relationships between grassroots leaders and politi-
cians are not as firm as patron-client relationships are supposed to be. Further-
more, Robredo does not possess huge personal wealth since he is neither a
landlord nor capitalist in the city. Wealthy families in the city do not even fully
support him, yet he has been able to maintain a great deal of political power.
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This implies that private wealth is not crucial for gaining and holding political
power.
The discussion in the chapters of this study can be summed up as follows.
Chapter 1 presented the state-centered framework, and Chapter 2 provided
background about Naga City. Chapter 3 showed that local power holders in
Naga City have enjoyed access to the state resources historically. Ramon
Felipe and Vicente Sibulo, who were the city’s first power holders after local
elections began, achieved their political clout through their networks with
national political figures as well as their careers as state officials. However,
when they lost their monopoly over state resources in the city under President
Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship, they were forced to withdraw from Naga
City politics. The second power holder, Villafuerte, came to power with the
backing of President Marcos when the president set up his authoritarian re-
gime and centralized control over state resources. Chapter 4 dealt with the
third power holder, Jesse Robredo, pointing out that he first came to power
with the backing of Villafuerte, but then expanded and consolidated his power
by means of his position as mayor and his ties with President Fidel Ramos.
Following the rift in their relationship, Villafuerte challenged Robredo at least
twice to take back power in Naga City, but Robredo’s firm control over state
resources prevented Villafuerte from succeeding. The key to success for all
these power holders and gaining control of city government was access to and
monopoly over the state resources in their bailiwick.
Chapters 5 and 6 dealt with the micro-level mechanism sustaining Robredo’s
power. Chapter 5 showed that as mayor, the legal institutional framework
gives Robredo a great deal of discretion over city government resources. At
the same time, Robredo has managed the city government efficiently and
demonstrated good performance. The middle class especially has welcomed
this aspect of his administration. Chapter 6 examined how Robredo has se-
cured support from the urban poor. Using his prerogatives and resources
pointed out in Chapter 5, Robredo was able to incorporate the city govern-
ment and sector-based organizations into a strong political machine. These
sector-based organizations, it should be emphasized, were set up on city
government initiative.
Finally, Chapter 7 described the political elite and grassroots-level leaders
in the city. Robredo controls these groups based on his position as the final
decision maker on resource utilization. Neither the political elite nor grassroots
leaders depend on personal relations with voters or on personal wealth to
maintain their political positions. They maintain their positions only through
their access to state resources, which is facilitated by the mayor. The grassroots
leaders are basically intermediaries or brokers between the city government
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and the residents. These leaders are controlled through a balanced use of
rewards and sanctions. But the good performance of the Robredo administra-
tion also motivates the elite and grassroots leaders to support the mayor for
both realizing moral ideal of good governance and increasing the availability
of resources.
This case study showed clearly that the presence of the state is extremely
important in Naga City politics. There are two reasons for this. The first is that
the state holds relatively more resources than the society does. Basically late
industrialization causes the state to hold rather more resources while causing a
scarcity of resources in the society. The second reason is that state institutions
define the rules of resource utilization. Philippine state institutions were set up
on the American model and give elected officials many prerogatives in con-
trolling resources in both personnel management and financial matters. There-
fore, holding an elective position is a requisite for attaining power. Holding an
elective position also means having to survive regularly held election, and this
compels power holders to set up and maintain systems for distributing benefits
in order to win elections. In the case of Naga City, this system for distribution
is Robredo’s political machine. Finally, local power holders need to have
smooth relations with state officials at the national level in order to monopo-
lize the resources in their bailiwicks. This is because local government institu-
tionally divides state resources into national and local ones. Pork barrel projects
of the president, senators, and congressmen as well as the president’s discre-
tion to allocate other resources play a significant role in the monopoly that
local power holders have over resources. The rise and downfall of Felipe and
Sibulo and Villafuerte’s gaining and losing power in Naga City, and the rise
and continued strength of Robredo are all related in one way or another to
their networks with national power holders.
In such a political structure, the political machine emerges as a strategic
choice of the political elite, especially in the urbanized socioeconomic situa-
tion. Confronting an increasing number of urban poor, the machine provides
the elite with a number of advantages for controlling both resources and
grassroots leaders. The machine backed by state resources is effective for
maintaining the support of voters in urban areas in the Philippines.1
This case study of Naga City also raises a question about the roles of
morality and performance in politics. Robredo is definitely not a so-called
“warlord” who is characterized by violence, coercion, corruption, and illegal
economic activities. He does not possess a private army; he does not force
residents to take certain actions; he has not accumulated a private wealth
through public office; and he has taken a tough stance against illegal gambling
and other forms of illegal economic activities. Without any doubt, he has
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shown complete morality as a public official. Moreover, as described in this
study, he raised the financial status of the city and pushed the rapid develop-
ment of infrastructure. He introduced the “Productivity Improvement Pro-
gram” which increased the motivation of city employees and the efficiency of
public services. Such innovations and performance in the city governance
raised him up as one of the most outstanding local politicians in the Philip-
pines. Have his morality and performance been factors in sustaining his politi-
cal clout?
The answer is “yes,” but with certain reservation. It would be incorrect to
understand morality and performance only in terms of normative discussions.
A certain amount of Robredo’s support has come from this aspect especially
from the middle class which does not depend so much on the distribution of
divisible benefits from the government. But he should not be put into the same
category as resource-less “progressive movements” or “reform movements,”
which have existed in some areas of the Philippines. Robredo has a political
machine and resources. If integrity itself were enough to achieve power, he
would not need to spend such enormous energy keeping his machine active
and cohesive. Performance is likewise important. It has brought Robredo the
reputation of being an able government official. But it needs to be remem-
bered that good performance is not merely a matter of an ideal but also as
matter of satisfying citizen’s material demands without wasting taxes. More-
over, good performance raises the availability of resources in the long run.
Thus, morality and performance matter, on condition that they are backed
by resource. Power is maintained by the strategic utilization of material re-
sources. Robredo himself admits to this and even emphasizes the importance
of his machine by saying: “We are one of the best organized. I guess our secret
really is not just our performance. I think it’s an organization. Although we do
perform well, I guess, but you know, even if I perform excellently, if I don’t
have a good organization, I cannot win on a straight ticket.”2 In effect Robredo
uses his political machine to solidify his political foundation while adding
charisma, morality, and indivisible material benefits through performance to
this foundation as other significant political resources.
A crisis of power could be caused either by losing one’s monopoly over
state resources or by the excessive imbalance of rewards, sanctions, and
demands. The former would be a conflict with national power. Such a conflict
could cause a diversion of national resources to opponents which would
eventually erode a local power holder’s monopoly over state resources. The
latter would be due to unfairness in the distribution of benefits or excessive
sanctions. This could trigger dissatisfaction and contention among the resi-
dents. An example of the latter took place in one barangay in Naga City. It
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arose between the city government and a group of residents over land utiliza-
tion. The trouble damaged Robredo’s mayoral candidate who lost the vote in
that barangay though he was top in all the other barangays.3
The significance of the state and institutions drawn from this case study of
Naga City should not be limited to the discussion on local politics only. Its
implications should be noted for further research on Philippine politics as a
whole. The sociocultural approach has dominated not only the study of local
politics but also that of other areas such as the bureaucracy, political parties,
and government-business relations in the Philippines. These areas have all
been discussed from a sociocultural perspective which emphasizes values and
social structure. However, an examination of these areas from the perspective
of the state and its institutions opens up new possibilities for explaining
political patterns and illuminating neglected causal relations. The accumula-
tion of empirical research free from the conventional perspective of seeing the
Philippine state as weak can open a new stage for studies on Philippine
politics.
Notes
1 Once a political machine is firmly established, short-term benefits provided by
opponents cannot erode its influence; at least this has been the case in Naga City.
This indicates that voters calculate and compare which candidates will be more
beneficial to them in the long run. During the 1998 elections, there was vote
buying by Robredo’s opponent. It reached its peak the night before election day.
The opponent’s grassroots leaders visited residents, especially the urban poor,
and distributed money or foods like rice, coffee, milk, and noodles. However, it
did not work as shown in the landslide victory of Robredo’s slate. Of course,
Robredo took countermeasure by mobilizing his own grassroots leaders and the
police to monitor and stop such distributions.
2 Interview with Jesse M. Robredo at Naga City Hall on August 19, 1997.
3 The conflict took place between the city government and squatters regarding
construction of a big shopping mall where the squatters lived. See Fer Basbas,
“The Marasigan Story: Naga’s Slum Fights for Survival,” Bikol Daily, August 26
and 28, 1997.
